Dina Osama Lotfy, Cairo University

[Cover image source Thomson Reuters; Riot policemen fire tear gas to disperse a Catholic priest and demonstrators during a protest against DRC President Joseph Kabila organized by the Catholic church in Kinshasa]

We are witnessing a wave of democratic backsliding—often referred to as the Third Wave of Autocratization—in which many countries are transitioning toward autocracy through democratic regression, breakdown, or even autocratic consolidation. Recent political science research has begun to examine the role of various actors in resisting democratic decline, but there is still limited analysis of the role of religious actors in general and religious institutions specifically.

In new research published in the journal Politics and Religion, I examine the stances of national Catholic churches toward electoral manipulation across Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia in the “post-Third Wave” period (1990s–2023). Many countries experienced transitions toward democracy (not necessarily full democracy) between the 1970s and 1990s (the “Third Wave”) but are now facing significant democratic setbacks. One of the main autocratic tactics observed is electoral manipulation—strategic efforts to sway elections in favor of incumbent rulers.

I compiled data on 59 cases documenting Catholic Church responses to alleged electoral manipulation. These responses included forms of active resistance to electoral manipulation or appeasement of the authoritarian move either by remaining silent or calling for peace and stability.

Why Catholic churches specifically?

National Catholic churches played important and varied roles during the Third Wave of Democratization (1970s–1990s)—so much so that Samuel Huntington referred to it as a “Catholic wave,” since most countries undergoing democratic transitions were predominantly Catholic. While some national churches helped promote democratization, others hindered it or remained neutral. This raises an important question: What role are they playing now in the face of current democratic setbacks?

I find that 32% of Catholic churches resisted electoral manipulation, 34% called for peace, and 34% took no stance in the post-Third Wave period. Resistance occurred in cases such as Venezuela (2018) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (2011, 2018, 2023). Calls for peace and stability were observed in Sierra Leone (2023) and Burundi (2010). Public silence was evident in countries such as Rwanda. There has not been a united front among national Catholic churches to preserve the integrity of electoral democracy in the post-Third Wave period.

It is also worth noting that this kind of strategic attack on electoral integrity was not only witnessed in Third Wave regions but also in established democracies. A striking example is the United States, where Trump’s supporters attacked the U.S. Capitol in rejection of the election results. While the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops publicly condemned the violence and called for a peaceful transition of power—one of the core principles of democracy—there were clear divisions among U.S. Catholic bishops, with some strongly condemning the violence, others defending democracy, and some remaining silent.

What explains these divergent stances?

I draw on the political economy of religion approach, which posits that religious institutions’ political behavior depends on cost–benefit calculations regarding their freedom from state regulation and competition. From this perspective, Catholic churches are more likely to resist electoral manipulation when the state provides low official support for Catholicism, even when they represent a considerable proportion of the population. But historical commitments matter too – a church’s historical pro-democratization role can help them resist electoral manipulation in the post-Third Wave period, especially if it faces strong competition from other religious groups.

My statistical and substantive results support these arguments. Given these findings, we can predict whether a Catholic church in a given country will take action against alleged electoral manipulation by examining its historical stance toward authoritarianism, the level of religious competition it faces, and the degree of government support for its religion.

We can see some evidence of these contrasting forces in two cases. The Polish Catholic Church played a central role in the struggle against communism and in advocating for democracy during the Third Wave. However, it became entangled in Poland’s democratic crisis after 2015, and Catholic support for the regime led to questioning its moral authority. In contrast, the Democratic Republic of the Congo Catholic Church, facing religious competition and a more precarious position in the religious market, has consistently promoted democracy since the Third Wave to preserve its influence and followers. Its historical commitment to democracy remains stronger than that of the Polish Church, as the latter dominates the religious landscape without facing competition from other faiths or from communism.

Ultimately, religious institutions’ self-interest shapes whether they resist autocratization, call for peace, or remain silent. And that self-interest often means prioritizing stability over risking their status in society. Resisting backsliding does not guarantee success and can provoke retaliation, so churches weigh such risks against what they need to do to protect their moral authority, which may entail responding consistently with their historical commitments or responding to religious competitors.

The research demonstrates that Catholic churches vary significantly in their responses to autocratization. If even Catholic churches, with their historical legacy of democratic engagement and the backing of the Pope’s international voice, cannot always be relied upon to defend democracy, especially when influenced by factors such as religious competition or manipulation, it is even less likely that other religious groups without such a legacy would do so. This suggests that religion alone cannot be counted on as a safeguard against democratic backsliding.

Dina Osama Lotfy is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, Egypt. Her research interests include autocratic transitions, religion and politics, and terrorism. Her publications have appeared in Democratization, Government and Opposition, and Politics and Religion. Further information about her work can be found on her website, LinkedIn, X, and Bluesky.